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PRAGMATISM VS. PRINCIPLE: BANKRUPTCY
APPEALS AND EQUITABLE MOOTNESS
CHRISTOPHER W. FROST*
Bankruptcy reorganizations are often thought to present unique
problems requiring specialized doctrines. Equitable mootness is one such doctrine. This judge-made prudential limitation on appeal rights permits reviewing courts to dismiss otherwise justiciable appeals of bankruptcy court
confirmations of reorganization plans. It applies where granting relief
would disrupt the implementation of the plan or would harm reliance interests of parties affected by the plan.
Chapter 11 reorganizations present complex multilateral negotiation
problems. The bankruptcy represents a general default, pitting stakeholder
against stakeholder in conflicts that require a global settlement. The plan of
reorganization provides that global settlement through an interconnected
web of compromises. Equitable mootness is justified by a need to protect those
compromises against appellate challenge and, for most bankruptcy practitioners, the doctrine is viewed as necessary to protect the reorganization bargain.
This Article challenges that notion. Although equitable mootness has
considerable utility, it also has a dark side. Rather than simply protect reliance of innocent parties on completed transactions, equitable mootness has
become a feature of the reorganization process. It is a tool that can be wielded
by powerful parties to force a reorganization bargain over the dissent of
weaker parties. Seen in this light, the utility of the doctrine is likely outweighed by its ill effects.

* Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. I thank Elizabeth Cooney, University of Kentucky College of
Law Class of 2019, for her able research assistance and Professors Christopher Bradley and Ralph Brubaker and Hon. Tracey Wise for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank the University of Kentucky College of Law for supporting this research through a summer research grant.
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INTRODUCTION
Equitable mootness is a prudential limitation on appeal
rights that presently exists only in bankruptcy cases. Under the
doctrine, appellate courts may dismiss appeals of orders confirming a plan of reorganization where transactions contemplated under the plan have been so far consummated that the
relief requested of the appellate court threatens to “significantly and irrevocably disrupt the implementation of the plan
or disproportionately harm the reliance interests of other parties not before the court.”1 The loss of appeal rights under the
doctrine is complete where it applies.2 Courts applying the

1. In re City of Detroit, Michigan, 838 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir. 2016).
2. See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the decision that the claim was equitably moot
“slam[med] the courthouse door on the [plaintiffs] before they are even
heard on the merits”).
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doctrine usually do not even consider the merits of the underlying appeal, the amount in dispute, or the parties involved.3
Despite its name, the doctrine bears no relationship to
constitutional mootness4—it operates where a case or controversy is very much alive and where granting relief would have a
significant effect on the rights and obligations of the parties.5
In some sense, the problem addressed by equitable mootness
is the opposite of that addressed by constitutional mootness—
equitable mootness applies when overturning a decision would
do too much rather than too little.6 The doctrine is prompted
by the concern that a successful appeal regarding one aspect
of a plan would “knock the props out from under the authorization for every transaction that has taken place, [and] would
do nothing other than create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy Court.”7
It is true that bankruptcy reorganizations present complex and unusual issues and the negotiations regarding reorganization plans are unusually interdependent. Chapter 11 of
the bankruptcy code (the “Code”)8 provides a forum for all
3. See id. at 558–59; In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428,
434–35 (3d Cir. 2015).
4. See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994):
There is a big difference between inability to alter the outcome
(real mootness) and unwillingness to alter the outcome (“equitable
mootness”). Using one word for two different concepts breeds confusion. Accordingly, we banish “equitable mootness” from the (local) lexicon. We ask not whether this case is moot, “equitably” or
otherwise, but whether it is prudent to upset the plan of reorganization at this late date.
5. See, e.g., In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (5th Cir. 1994).
6. See Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 569 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Here it is
clear that a determination of the merits of the issues raised by the [Appellants] and the entry of a remedial order on the basis of such a determination
would have ‘some effect’—and potentially quite a substantial effect—in the
real world. (That is precisely why [Appellee] does not want to entertain the
appeal.”)).
7. In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1981).
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2012). Courts have also begun to apply equitable mootness to cases involving municipalities under Chapter 9. See In re
City of Stockton, Cal., 909 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 2018); Bennett v. Jefferson
Cty., Ala., 899 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2018); City of Detroit, Mich., 838 F.3d
792 (6th Cir. 2016). With the exception of arguments that specifically relate
to the applicability of the doctrine to Chapter 9, those cases are similar to
the cases under Chapter 11. For convenience, this article will refer to Chapter 11, but the analysis herein also applies to Chapter 9 cases.
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the creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders in a business to negotiate over the terms of the financial restructuring
of distressed business entities. The process hopes to achieve a
consensual resolution of the diverse claims held by these stakeholders with an overarching goal of preserving the business as
a going concern. Typically, the plan of reorganization fundamentally changes the nature and amount of obligations the
debtor owes to various constituencies. Pre-bankruptcy debt
claims are discharged, reduced, converted to equity, extended,
or subject to some combination of these changes. Equity
claims are reduced or eliminated. Contracts are terminated,
extended, or renegotiated. The plan often contemplates the
sale or liquidation of business units or individual assets. Normally, the plan contemplates new post-bankruptcy borrowing
by the debtor from institutional lenders.9 In sum, the entire
business is remade, and the debtor emerges with an entirely
different set of legal relationships than it had before bankruptcy.
Although the Chapter 11 process relies heavily on negotiated solutions, there are a number of provisions that bind dissenting stakeholders to the deal negotiated by the majority.
These provisions are a unique feature of the Chapter 11 process and are designed to solve the hold-out problems that
often derail nonbankruptcy reorganizations. For these dissenting creditors, the Code provides baseline protections that respect nonbankruptcy property interests and priority rights.
Simply put, there are limits to the ways in which even a majority supported plan can impair individual claimants’ rights.
Evaluating the treatment of dissenting creditors under a plan
requires a typical judicial process that applies standards of
treatment to complex facts and issues a judgment regarding
the plan’s legality in light of all objections. It is this judicial
process that results in appeals from otherwise consensual plan
confirmation orders.
Thus, no matter how much one may like to view bankruptcy reorganization through a deal-making frame, ultimately
Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a judicial process—with all the protections we come to expect from such a process. In this light,
equitable mootness seems not only highly unusual, but it also
violates the long-standing principle that federal courts have a
9. See generally, 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (2010) (effect of confirmation).
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“‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise the jurisdiction
[they] have been given.”10 Although the doctrine has been
adopted by every circuit,11 the constitutional and statutory ba10. In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d at 568 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976)).
11. Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1330
(10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e formally adopt the doctrine commonly known as
‘equitable mootness’ ”); Briggs v. LaBarge (In re McGregory), 223 Fed. Appx.
530, 531 (8th Cir. 2007) (“We noted that mootness in the bankruptcy setting
‘involves equitable considerations’ and a case may be deemed moot if relief
is conceivable but would be inequitable to the debtor.”); In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 559 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (The court decided to follow other circuits in stating that “[w]hether termed ‘equitable mootness’ or
a prudence doctrine, we see no reason why the Third Circuit should part
company with our sister circuits in their adoption of this doctrine.”); City of
Covington v. Covington Landing Ltd. Partnership, 71 F.3d 1221, 1225–26
(6th Cir. 1995) (The court evaluated whether the claim was “equitably estopped” by looking at the three factor test adopted by the Fifth Circuit and
considerations regarding the requirements of seeking a stay from the Seventh Circuit); Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 29 F.3d 1034, 1038 (5th Cir.
1994) (“Many courts, including our own, however, have employed the concept of ‘mootness’ to address equitable concerns unique to bankruptcy proceedings.”); In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 1994) (In adopting the
doctrine, the court “banish[ed] ‘equitable mootness’ from the (local) lexicon” because “the name is misleading,” however, still carried the same general analysis of the doctrine, determining “whether it is prudent to upset the
plan of reorganization at this late date.”); In re Chateaugay Corp., 988 F.2d
322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993) (The court determined that “[a]n appeal should also
be dismissed as moot when, even though effective relief could conceivably
be fashioned, implementation of that relief would be inequitable.” (citing In
re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir 1986); In re Roberts Farms,
Inc., 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1981))); In re Public Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 469,
471–72 (1st Cir. 1992) (The court acknowledged that the mootness “is premised on jurisdictional and equitable considerations stemming from the impracticability of fashioning fair and effective judicial relief.” Along with a
Seventh Circuit case, the court based this reasoning on In re Stadium Management Corp., a case in which the court decided the case was moot because
there was “no remedy it could fashion,” the court wanted to protect a good
faith purchaser, and there was a finality of bankruptcy proceedings. In re
Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d 845, 847–48 (1st Cir. 1990)); In re
Onouli-Kona Land Co., 846 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 1988) (First termed as
“Bankruptcy’s mootness rule,” the court acknowledged that the rule exists
and was developed from the need for finality in bankruptcy cases); Central
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc.,
841 F.2d 92, 96 (4th Cir. 1988) (Without naming it, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the “dismissal of the appeal on mootness grounds is required when implementation of the plan has created, extinguished or modi-
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ses of equitable mootness have recently been under increasing
scrutiny.12
One hardly needs to defend the notion that appeals are
an important feature of our judicial process, albeit one that is
not constitutionally guaranteed in civil cases.13 Beyond the obvious function of error correction, appeals serve important systemic functions: development and refinement of law, promotion of uniformity in law, and assuring legitimacy of, and respect for, the law.14 Litigants have come to expect at least a
right to a first level appeal of most issues—a right which serves
as an important limit on the power of any one judge.15
This, perhaps, is especially important in bankruptcy cases.
Bankruptcy judges’ lack of Article III status has long created
constitutional issues that, thus far, have been mostly resolved
through fragile compromises that rely on the supervision of
bankruptcy judges by Article III judges.16 In addition, bankruptcy judges are quite specialized and are immersed in both
bankruptcy law and practice. Review by generalist judges may
therefore serve an important role in providing an objective
view on matters that seem routine for bankruptcy specialists.
On the other hand, bankruptcy reorganizations present
unique problems that arguably require a somewhat truncated
judicial process. Most of the cases applying equitable mootness
point to the need for finality in the bankruptcy process so as
fied rights, particularly of persons not before the court, to such an extent
that effective judicial relief is no longer practically available.”); Miami Ct.
Ltd. Partnership v. Bank of N.Y., 820 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir. 1987) (Departing from past precedent, which held appeals automatically moot upon failure to obtain a stay, the court followed In re AOV Industries in stating that
“[t]he proper standard to apply in this case is whether the reorganization
plan has been so substantially consummated that effective relief is no longer
available.” In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147–49 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (The
court determined that it would narrowly apply In re Roberts Farms, stating that
the court could render moot all cases that were “substantially consummated”
but would allow it after an individual analysis of a case “where the plan of
arrangement has been so far implemented that it is impossible to fashion effective relief for all concerned.” (quoting In re Roberts Farm, 652 F.2d 793, 797 (9th
Cir. 1981)))).
12. See infra Section I.B.
13. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219
(2013).
14. See id. at 1225.
15. See id. at 1221.
16. See infra notes 53–83 and accompanying text.
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not to defeat the expectations that the numerous parties affected by the bankruptcy develop based on a confirmed plan.
Once the plan is consummated, overturning the plan or any
aspect of it might unravel the entire web of transactions set out
in the plan—even transactions that do not relate directly to
the dispute that forms the basis for the appeal. Bankruptcy
usually is a zero-sum game with a final endpoint. An increase
in legal entitlements of one claimant usually results in a reduction of entitlements for the others and the system is designed
to finally resolve all the claims against the debtor and its assets.
Thus, each of the agreements constituting the plan are dependent on, and intertwined with, all the other agreements and
overturning any aspect of the plan often disrupts all other aspects. This complexity is exacerbated by the fact that immediately after confirmation, the reorganized company will begin
interacting with others who may not have been involved with
the bankruptcy case. All of this is usually described as the problem of “unscrambling an egg.”17
Add to all those issues the fact that the business itself may
not survive the time necessary for appeals. One might think
that the unscrambling problem might be resolved simply by
imposing a delay in the scrambling. Like general appellate
practice, imposing a stay on the consummation of a plan of
reorganization would permit appeals to run their course and
thus might preserve both the pre-bankruptcy positions of the
parties and the rights of dissenters to have their claims fully
adjudicated. Bankruptcy practitioners raise their pragmatic objections to such a stay with another metaphor. A distressed
business, it is often said, is a “melting ice cube.”18 Delay in
bankruptcy resulting from such niceties as traditional judicial
process might result in there being nothing left to reorganize.19 Thus, stays of confirmation orders are rarely granted,20
leaving appellate courts with a choice between overturning the
order and throwing the business into disarray or turning a
17. See, e.g., In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he
reasons underlying §§ 363(m) and 1127(b)—preserving interests bought
and paid for in reliance on judicial decisions, and avoiding the pains that
attend any effort to unscramble an egg—are so plain and so compelling that
courts fill the interstices of the Code with the same approach.”).
18. In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 551 (3d Cir. 2015).
19. See id.
20. See generally In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (5th Cir. 1994).
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blind eye to meritorious legal and factual arguments raised by
disappointed litigants.21
For many in the bankruptcy community, equitable mootness provides an appropriate trade-off by protecting the bankruptcy deal even where the plan violates the rights of a few
claimants.22 Most of the justifications for this view, however, do
not adequately consider the effect that the doctrine may have
on the process of reaching the deal in the first place. The
threat of an appeal provides an important measure of leverage
in negotiations surrounding any legal controversy. Parties negotiating in an uncertain legal or factual climate do so with an
eye toward the likelihood that they will prevail if the negotiations break down and they are forced to litigate. That view necessarily takes account not only of the prospect of winning at
the trial level, but also the likelihood of that decision being
overturned or affirmed on appeal. By cutting off that prospect,
equitable mootness reduces that leverage.
Of course, if bankruptcy court decisions are correct, or if
the errors are unbiased, the loss of appeal rights would affect
all parties equally. They would all understand that they had
one shot at their arguments and would negotiate with that reality in mind. There may, however, be some reason to believe
that the loss of appeal rights might create a more systematic
bias against economically weaker parties or parties who have
dissented from a deal reached by the most powerful players.
The bankruptcy process relies on deals to resolve financial crises so, naturally, the incentive to protect the deal is strong—
even if it has been negotiated without adequate consideration
of minority claimants. But the notion that cutting off appeal
rights is the only or even the best way to accomplish and preserve such deals should be approached with a healthy degree
of skepticism. Perhaps it is easier to truncate judicial process
and perhaps the right to appeal may create its own opportunities for strategic behavior, but it is far from clear that equitable
mootness, as the courts have developed the doctrine, provides
the right balance between principle and pragmatism.
This Article reviews the doctrine of equitable mootness
with a particular focus on its role in bankruptcy negotiations.
21. See id.
22. See Tribune Media Co. v. Aurelius Capital Mgmt., L.P., 799 F.3d 272,
288 (3d Cir. 2015).

2019]

PRAGMATISM VS. PRINCIPLE

485

Although discussions of equitable mootness often focus on the
difficulty of unwinding the complex and interwoven transactions contemplated by a reorganization plan, an equally important consideration is the role of equitable mootness on the
reorganization process itself. An examination of that aspect of
the doctrine reveals a dark side that makes the doctrine substantially less appealing. Part I sets out the basic doctrinal factors courts typically recite when applying the doctrine and reviews the judicial debate over the foundations of the doctrine.
Part II takes a closer look at the effect of equitable mootness
on the plan negotiation process—particularly the role of the
doctrine in encouraging reliance and accelerating finality.
Part III examines the dark side of the doctrine and the potential for plan proponents to use the doctrine to overcome review of bankruptcy court decisions on controversial issues. Part
IV discusses the importance of appeal rights in bankruptcy in
providing review by judges who are not so immersed in the
case or bankruptcy, generally. Part V considers the necessity of
the doctrine, concluding that the problems posed by appellate
review of bankruptcy cases are likely misunderstood and that
equitable mootness is an overbroad way of dealing with those
problems.
I.
DETERMINING EQUITABLE MOOTNESS –
THE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
Courts employ some form of a factor test to determine
whether to apply equitable mootness. The tests used differ
slightly, but, whether the courts employ a three, four, or five
factor test, most emphasize common themes. Most courts
make clear that the doctrine is a limited one—employed in
rare cases in which the appellate court cannot fashion a remedy that will not disappoint the expectations of some of the
stakeholders of the debtor. Reliance is the most prevalent
theme in the cases. Naturally, a plan of reorganization is intended to settle numerous controversies and upsetting that settlement has effects on both the parties to the compromise and
on other parties who, though not directly involved in the dispute, have nevertheless taken actions in reliance on the settlement. This Part sets out the basic doctrinal factors courts use
in determining whether to apply equitable mootness. Here,
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with a few exceptions, we find consistency. Next, this Part discusses the controversy over the foundations of the doctrine.
A. Doctrinal Factors
Although the analysis of equitable mootness by the various circuits follows slightly varying formulations, many courts
recite the factors set out by the Third Circuit in In re Continental Airlines:
(1) whether the reorganization plan has been substantially consummated,
(2) whether a stay has been obtained,
(3) whether the relief requested would affect the
rights of parties not before the court,
(4) whether the relief requested would affect the
success of the plan, and
(5) the public policy of affording finality to bankruptcy judgments.23
As the Third Circuit later recognized, however, some of
these factors are repetitive. For example, a stay of the confirmation order would normally prevent the substantial consummation of a plan.24 Also, the policy of affording finality to
bankruptcy judgments is linked to the desire for successful
plans of reorganization because finality “encourages investors
and others to rely on confirmation orders, thereby facilitating
successful reorganizations by fostering confidence in the finality of confirmed plans.”25 These observations led the Third
Circuit to a more compact formulation:
In practice, it is useful to think of equitable mootness
as proceeding in two analytical steps:
(1) whether a confirmed plan has been substantially
consummated; and
(2) if so, whether granting the relief requested in the
appeal will (a) fatally scramble the plan and/or (b)

23. In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560 (3d Cir. 1996).
24. In re Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 322 (3d Cir. 2013).
25. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir.
2012), as corrected (Oct. 25, 2012) (citations omitted). Cf. In re U.S. Airways
Grp., Inc., 369 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 2004) (omitting a consideration of the
public policy in favor of finality, but including the factor relating to the success of the plan).
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significantly harm third parties who have justifiably
relied on plan confirmation.26
This formulation narrows the focus of the inquiry to nonappealing parties’ reliance on the plan either in undertaking
the transactions contemplated in the plan or in transacting
business with the debtor following the confirmation of the
plan. This reliance is at the core of the courts’ expressed concerns that overturning such a complex arrangement as that
contemplated by a plan would “knock the props out from
under the authorization for every transaction that has taken
place, [and] would do nothing other than create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy Court.”27
Although most of the focus is on the reliance of third parties and participants in the reorganization, courts do pay some
attention to the diligence of the appealing party in obtaining,
or at least seeking, a stay of the confirmation order. The effect
of the stay is an important factor, insofar as a stay would normally prevent the consummation of a plan.28 Thus, equitable
mootness really only applies in circumstances in which a stay
has not been granted.29 Where there has been no stay, the effect of the appealing party’s unsuccessful efforts to obtain a
stay is difficult to generalize. One might imagine that an appellant that pursues a stay with vigor, but who is ultimately denied
the relief, would be treated appreciably better than an appellant who does not seek a stay. A number of courts count the
26. Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 321. See also In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034 at 1039
(“This court has historically examined three factors in making this assessment—(i) whether a stay has been obtained, (ii) whether the plan has been
‘substantially consummated,’ and (iii) whether the relief requested would
affect either the rights of parties not before the court or the success of the
plan.”).
27. In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1981) (early
case that is widely considered as the genesis of the doctrine).
28. See Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 322. Substantial consummation is not a difficult hurdle to overcome in the cases in which equitable mootness is a factor.
11 U.S.C.A. § 1101(2) (1978) defines “substantial consummation” as:
(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by
the plan to be transferred;
(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor
under the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan; and
(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.
29. See Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 323.
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failure to seek a stay strongly against the appellant,30 but do
not necessarily find that such a failure is fatal to the application of equitable mootness.31
On the other hand, an unsuccessful effort to obtain a stay
does not insulate the appeal from the doctrine. As the Seventh
Circuit noted:
The significance of an application for a stay lies in
the opportunity it affords to hold things in stasis, to
prevent reliance on the plan of reorganization while
the appeal proceeds. A stay not sought, and a stay
sought and denied, lead equally to the implementation of the plan of reorganization. And it is the reliance interests engendered by the plan, coupled with
the difficulty of reversing the critical transactions,
that counsels against attempts to unwind things on
appeal.32
Thus, wise counsel would at least seek a stay, but would
understand that an unsuccessful motion to stay consummation
would not insulate the appellant from claims of equitable
mootness.33
The standard of review by appellate courts of a district
court’s application of equitable mootness varies among the circuits. The Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits have adopted an

30. See In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 369 F.3d 806, 809–10 (4th Cir.
2004) (failure to seek a stay weighs strongly against appellant); Matter of
Specialty Equip. Companies, Inc., 3 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A]
party that elects not to pursue a stay subsequent to confirmation risks that a
speedy implementation of the reorganization will moot an appeal.”).
31. Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 323 (“Though Appellants would have been wise
to seek a stay to stop the prospect of equitable mootness in its tracks, their
statutory right to appeal . . . is not premised on their doing so.”).
32. In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769–70 (7th Cir. 1994); see also, In re
Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 1994).
33. Even where a stay is sought, the cost of posting a bond substantial
enough to cover the costs of delaying a reorganization plan can be an impediment to the appellants efforts to stay the consummation of the plan. In
these cases, courts are somewhat unsympathetic. See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91
F.3d 553, 562 (3d Cir. 1996) (unwillingness of appellants to post a bond
weighs heavily against them); Tribune Media Co. v. Aurelius Capital Mgmt.,
L.P., 799 F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 2015) ($1.5 billion bonding requirement not
met by appellant, which never challenged the amount of the bond, led court
to conclude that finding of mootness was not unfair).
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abuse of discretion standard,34 while the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits review the facts for clear error but the
legal conclusions on a de novo standard.35 The Second Circuit
adds a unique twist, stating that substantial consummation of
the plan creates a presumption of equitable mootness unless
the appellant can establish that each of five factors are met:
(1) “the court can still order some effective relief”;
(2) “such relief will not affect the re-emergence of
the debtor as a revitalized corporate entity”;
(3) “such relief will not unravel intricate transactions
so as to knock the props out from under the authorization for every transaction that has taken place and
create an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for
the Bankruptcy Court”;
(4) “the parties who would be adversely affected by
the modification have notice of the appeal and an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings”; and
(5) “the appellant pursued with diligence all available remedies to obtain a stay of execution of the objectionable order if the failure to do so creates a situation rendering it inequitable to reverse the orders
appealed from.”36
Most courts that have considered the Second Circuit’s approach have rejected it, reasoning that although substantial
consummation is an important factor, the court must further
consider whether effective relief can be granted,37 and that the
party seeking to invoke equitable mootness should bear the
burden of showing that such extraordinary relief is warranted.38
34. Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d at 277; In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691
F.3d 476, 483 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Paige, 584 F.3d 1327, 1335 (10th Cir.
2009).
35. In re City of Detroit, 838 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir. 2016); In re Nica
Holdings, Inc., 810 F.3d 781, 786 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Transwest Resort
Properties, Inc., 801 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2015); In re GWI PCS 1, Inc.,
230 F.3d 788, 799 (5th Cir. 2000).
36. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d at 482 (quoting In re Chateaugay
Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 952–53 (2d Cir. 1993)).
37. See Transwest, 801 F.3d at 1169.
38. We have never explicitly addressed which party bears the burden
to prove that, weighing these factors, dismissal is warranted. Dismissing an appeal over which we have jurisdiction, as noted, should
be the rare exception and not the rule. It should also be based on
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Finally, there is some limited authority among the circuits
for considering the type of issues raised by appellants and the
potential merits of the appeal. In In re Pacific Lumber,39 the
Fifth Circuit specifically noted that the issues raised on appeal
concerned the valuation of collateral securing the appellants’
claims and the secured creditors’ right to credit bid.40 The fact
that the appeal involved the property rights of the secured
creditor was part of the court’s rationale for hearing the appeal:
We hold these issues justiciable notwithstanding the
tug of equitable mootness. Secured credit represents
property rights that ultimately find a minimum level
of protection in the takings and due process clauses
of the Constitution. The Bankruptcy Code’s reorganization provisions in fact “preserve the essence” of the
boundaries of secured creditors’ rights laid out in
constitutional cases. Federal courts should proceed
with caution before declining appellate review of the
adjudication of these rights under a judge-created abstention doctrine. Moreover, while we have found no
case that applied equitable mootness to decline review of the treatment of a secured creditor’s claim, at
least two cases in this court have ruled on such appeals despite plan proponents’ pleas for equitable
mootness.41
Similarly, the court held that a consideration of the legality of non-debtor releases granted by the plan and objected to
by the appellants could not be barred by equitable mootness.42
Quoting an earlier decision by the Fifth Circuit, the court
stated, “‘[E]quity strongly supports appellate review of issues
consequential to the integrity and transparency of the Chapter

an evidentiary record, and not speculation. To encourage this, we
join other Courts of Appeals in placing the burden on the party
seeking dismissal.
In re Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing In re Lett, 632
F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 2011)); In re Paige, 584 F.3d 1327, 1339–40 (10th
Cir. 2009); In re Focus Media, Inc., 378 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2004).
39. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
40. Id. at 248.
41. Id. at 243 (citations omitted).
42. See id. at 252.

2019]

PRAGMATISM VS. PRINCIPLE

491

11 process.43 On the other hand, the court had little difficulty
applying the doctrine to impairment and classification issues
and to unfair discrimination claims by the appellants.44 These
claims all related to claimed violations of the general standards
for confirmation and not to issues that went to the secured
creditor’s property claims or the jurisdiction of the court to
approve a non-debtor release.45 Sometimes, then, the nature
of the claim raised may impact the court’s view of the doctrine.
The more fundamental the issue, the more likely a court will
hear an appeal.
At least one circuit specifically looks at the merits of the
claims presented on appeal in determining whether an appeal
is equitably moot. In In re Paige,46 the Tenth Circuit adopted a
six-factor test for equitable mootness. In addition to the standard factors focusing on substantial consummation, whether
the appellant sought a stay, and the general reliance factors
(third parties, success of reorganization, and public policy),
the court asked “[B]ased on a quick look at the merits of appellant’s challenge to the plan, is appellant’s challenge legally
meritorious or equitably compelling?”47 The case involved
competing plans of reorganization by two claim buyers who
sought control over the debtor’s only valuable asset.48 The losing party claimed that the Chapter 11 trustee had conflicts of
interest while favoring the winning bidder and had engaged in
inappropriate negotiations.49 The court concluded that the
appellants claims had some merit and constituted “serious
matters that will not lightly be swept under the rug in the
name of equitable mootness”50 The court stated further, “[i]n
many ways, the claims raised go to the very integrity of the
bankruptcy process in this case.”51 Having found the remain-

43. Id. at 251 (quoting In re Hilal, 534 F.3d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 2008)).
44. Id. at 250–51.
45. See id. at 250–51.
46. In re Paige, 584 F.3d 1327, 1339 (10th Cir. 2009).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1331–32 (the asset was the debtor’s rights in the domain name
“FreeCreditScore.com”).
49. Id. at 1333.
50. Id. at 1348.
51. Id.
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ing factors inconclusive, the court let the quick look decide
against the application of equitable mootness.52
With these few exceptions, there is remarkable consistency between the language the courts use in determining
whether to invoke equitable mootness. Substantial consummation and the absence of a stay on the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order are universal requirements. The efforts of the
appellant to obtain a stay are important, but not conclusive.
Most of the effort is employed in analyzing the nature of the
remedy sought and the effect that that remedy will have on the
plan itself, or third parties who might have their reliance interests in the plan disappointed.
B. The Fragile Foundations of Equitable Mootness –
the Third Circuit Debate
Although every circuit has approved the use of equitable
mootness to dismiss bankruptcy appeals, there have been a few
dissenting voices. The earliest of these was then-Judge Samuel
Alito’s dissent, joined by five other judges, in In re Continental
Airlines.53 This en banc review of a panel decision considered
the appeal by trustees for secured creditors over the bankruptcy court’s treatment of adequate protection claims and
raised an issue of first impression in the Circuit.54 The Third
Circuit declined to consider the questions, finding that the appeal was equitably moot.55
Judge Alito’s dissent directly challenged the notion that
the doctrine was necessary to facilitate reorganizations or protect those who have reasonably relied on reorganization
plans.56 The doctrine, he noted, is not based on Article III or
52. The court cited a Second Circuit decision, In re Metromedia Fiber
Network, 416 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2005), for the proposition that the court
may consider the merits of the case before considering equitable mootness.
Paige, 584 F.3d at 1348. Although the Metromedia court did state that it was
proper to consider the merits, the decision did not do so as a component of
its equitable mootness analysis. In fact, the opinion is clear that the court
applied equitable mootness in spite of the merit of the appellant’s claims.
Metromedia, 426 F.3d at 143–44.
53. In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 567 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 557 (The issue was whether “a creditor must file a motion to lift
the automatic stay as a prerequisite to seeking adequate protection.”).
55. Id. at 557–58.
56. Id. at 572 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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non-Article III mootness, and therefore is not jurisdictional,
precluding a ruling on the merits.57 Instead, he noted, that
even if it were true that granting the appellants full relief
would imperil the reorganization plan—an outcome that was
not self-evident—the doctrine would not preclude the court
from hearing the merits and awarding some limited relief.58
Further, Judge Alito dismissed concerns that the doctrine was
necessary to protect the reasonable reliance of investors in the
reorganized company. After detailing the plan provisions that
made clear that an appeal would result in the allowance of
additional administrative claims (the chief complaint of the investors) the dissent stated:
Under these circumstances, any prudent investor, in
deciding whether to invest in NewCal on particular
terms, would have taken into account the range and
likelihood of possible outcomes in the Trustees’ appeal, including the possibility that some or all of the
amount sought by the Trustees would have to be paid
as an administrative claim pursuant to Section 10.1 of
the plan. No reasonable investor would have proceeded on the assumption that the Trustees would
definitely recover nothing. And the same is true of
the other parties that relied on the plan.59
Even if there were reliance interests that deserved protection, the dissent continued, those interests could be taken into
account at the remedy stage, as could the effect of the failure
of the appellant to obtain a stay.60
Ultimately, Judge Alito’s dissent admitted that while there
may be something to the notion that reliance interests based
on the plan or on post-bankruptcy investments may preclude
full recovery, there is no justification for dismissing the appeal
outright, before even hearing the merits. The dissent concluded:
The mere act of entertaining that claim would not
imperil Continental’s reorganization or impair any
legitimate reliance interests. If the Trustees’ claim
were considered and they won on the merits, any
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 571.
Id.
Id. at 572.
Id.
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threat to the reorganization or to legitimate reliance
interests could be taken into account in framing the
Trustees’ relief. What the district court and the majority have done—throwing the Trustees out of court
before the merits of their claim are even heard—is
unjustified and unjust.61
A more recent and more thorough critique of the doctrine was penned by Third Circuit Judge Krause in her concurring opinion in In re One2One Communications, LLC.62 There
the Third Circuit overturned the district court’s finding that
an appeal of a confirmation order was equitably moot. Judge
Krause agreed with the ruling but wrote separately to urge the
court to reconsider this “legally ungrounded and practically
unadministrable ‘judge-made abstention doctrine.’”63 This
concurring opinion sparked a debate in the Third Circuit as
Judge Ambro penned his own concurring opinion in In re Tribune Media Co.64 in response to Judge Krause’s views.
Much of Judge Krause’s concurring opinion was devoted
to considering the statutory and constitutional arguments
against the use of the doctrine. She began by establishing the
baseline rule that requires federal courts to hear cases within
their statutory jurisdiction.65 Although federal courts have a
few narrowly tailored abstention doctrines, she noted that
each of these doctrines only postpone the exercise of jurisdiction. “But where there is no other forum and no later exercise
of jurisdiction, as in the case of equitable mootness, relinquishing jurisdiction is not abstention; it’s abdication.”66 Judge
Krause also noted that the Supreme Court had recently decided Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,67 in
which the Court expressed its disapproval of the doctrine of
61. Id. at 572–73.
62. In re One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 438 (3d Cir. 2015)
(Krause, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. Tribune Media Co. v. Aurelius Capital Mgmt., L.P., 799 F.3d 272, 284
(3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring). The Tribune case was filed about one
month after the One2One case.
65. One2One, 805 F.3d at 439 (“The mandate that federal courts hear
cases within their statutory jurisdiction is a bedrock principle of our judiciary.”).
66. Id. at 440.
67. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118
(2014).
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“prudential standing.” That doctrine was thought to permit
federal courts to decline to decide claims based on the courts’
sense that Congress should have denied a cause of action to
the plaintiff, rather than on a statutory analysis to determine
whether a right of action was available. The Court, the concurrence noted, reaffirmed the virtually unflagging obligation of
a federal court to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction.68
Against this backdrop of principles, the concurrence
turned to explore potential statutory bases for the doctrine.
This has proven to be a difficult task for every court that examines the doctrine. The closest the Code comes to equitable
mootness are two provisions designed to protect good faith
purchasers of assets from the estate and lenders to the estate.69
The Code also protects finality in section 1127(b), which prohibits the modification of a plan by its proponent following its
substantial consummation.70 These provisions are dealt with in
one of two ways by the courts. Courts seeking to justify equitable mootness see in them a policy toward finality and protection of third parties. The fact that the Code does not directly
incorporate the doctrine is of no consequence, the failure is a
mere interstice, a gap, that courts can bridge to fulfill the intent of Congress to protect the finality of reorganization
plans.71 Critics of the doctrine, including Judge Krause, take a
differing approach. “Because Congress specified certain orders that cannot be disturbed on appeal absent a stay, basic
canons of statutory construction compel us to presume that
Congress did not intend for other orders to be immune from
appeal.”72 Because Judge Krause could not find a statutory basis for the doctrine, the baseline rule—requiring the courts to
68. One2One, 805 F.3d at 441.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2019) provides that the reversal or modification
of an un-stayed sale order does not affect the rights of the purchaser even
though the purchaser knows of the pendency of an appeal. 11 U.S.C.
§ 364(e) (2019) provides the same protection to lenders under an order
permitting the debtor to obtain credit.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b) (2019).
71. See, e.g., In re UNR Indus., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he
reasons underlying §§ 363(m) and 1127(b)—preserving interests bought
and paid for in reliance on judicial decisions, and avoiding the pains that
attend any effort to unscramble an egg—are so plain and so compelling that
courts fill the interstices of the Code with the same approach.”).
72. One2One, 805 F.3d at 444.
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fulfill their obligation to decide cases over which Congress has
granted them jurisdiction—controls.
But even if a statutory basis could be found, Judge Krause
believed the doctrine would raise constitutional problems that
would compel its rejection. The status of bankruptcy judges as
non-Article III officers creates constitutional concerns regarding the right of litigants to have their cases heard by an Article
III judge, while also raising structural concerns regarding the
institutional integrity of the judicial branch. These problems
animate the decisions of the Supreme Court in Stern v. Marshall,73 and, most recently, in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif.74 In Wellness, Judge Krause observed, the Court approved bankruptcy judges’ adjudication of Stern claims where
parties consent to such adjudication. The Wellness court premised its holding on the fact that the supervision Article III
courts exercise over the bankruptcy courts alleviates the structural concerns raised in Stern.75 Judge Krause stated:
Equitable mootness drastically weakens that supervisory authority, and therefore threatens a far greater
“impermissibl[e] intru[sion] on the province of the
judiciary,” than the Court confronted in Northern Pipeline, Stern, or Wellness International. The doctrine not
only prevents appellate review of a non-Article III
judge’s decision; it effectively delegates the power to
prevent that review to the very non-Article III tribunal whose decision is at issue. Although Article III
judges decide whether an appeal is equitably moot,
bankruptcy courts control nearly all of the variables
in the equation, including whether a reorganization
plan is initially approved, whether a stay of plan implementation is granted, whether settlements or releases crucial to a plan are approved and executed,
whether property is transferred, whether new entities
(in which third parties may invest) are formed, and
whether distributions (including to third parties)
under the plan begin—all before plan challengers
reach an Article III court.76
73.
74.
75.
76.

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
One2One, 805 F.3d at 445 (citing Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944).
Id. (citation omitted).
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Ultimately, Judge Krause concluded, the doctrine, “places
far too much power in the hands of bankruptcy judges,”77
leading her to conclude that equitable mootness raises serious
constitutional problems.78
Judge Ambro responded to the constitutional concerns
Judge Krause raised, arguing that the doctrine does not violate
the personal rights and separation of powers guaranteed by
Article III. His reading of the Stern and Wellness line of cases
led him to conclude that those cases were principally concerned with congressional aggrandizement inherent in the redirection of adjudication from state courts to Article I tribunals.79 In his view, as equitable mootness is determined by Article III courts, it does not pose the same issue as those
constitutional decisions. As such, the personal right of a litigant to an adjudication by an Article III judge is preserved because the decision is made by an Article III judge. Similarly,
because Article III judges control the doctrine, it does not create separation of powers issues.80
Judge Ambro also addressed Judge Krause’s view that the
Code does not provide a statutory basis for the doctrine.
Rather than search for such a basis, however, Judge Ambro
found that the inquiry was unnecessary. Instead he began his
discussion by noting that the Code does not bar the doctrine—a starting point that foreshadowed his decision.81 His
starting perspective was that equitable mootness was simply an
application of the general equitable power of the bankruptcy
court to limit relief where the balance of harms favors such
actions. Citing cases involving injunctive relief, Judge Ambro
noted that even where the party seeking relief has a justifiable

77. Id. at 446 (quoting Nordhoff Investments, Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp.,
258 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J., concurring)).
78. See also Robert Miller, Equitable Mootness: Ignorance is Bliss and Unconstitutional, 107 KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (“A prudential doctrine without a
statutory basis where a judge can eliminate an appeal without even considering the merits simply does not comport with the Supreme Court precedent
or the historical nature of bankruptcy court authority and appellate review.”).
79. Tribune Media Co. v. Aurelius Capital Mgmt., L.P., 799 F.3d 272, 285
(3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 286.
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claim, the courts may withhold relief based on the equities of
the case.82 He concluded:
[W]e believe that the One2One concurrence’s formal
challenge that equitable mootness lacks a basis in law
misses the point that it is in the equitable toolbox of
judges for that scarce case where the relief sought on
appeal from an implemented plan, if granted would
leave the plan in tatters and/or bankruptcy battlefield strewn with too many injured bodies.83
Thus, despite thoughtful dissent, equitable mootness remains an available tool in the Third Circuit and all the others.
C. The Doctrinal State of Equitable Mootness
What emerges from this review of equitable mootness
cases is a doctrine that is fairly stable in application but one
that may have some serious problems with its foundation. Most
of the cases hew to well-accepted factor tests and the application of the doctrine is, within reasonable bounds, fairly predictable—at least within particular circuits. Without the foundational concerns, these factors would augur against Supreme
Court review because the doctrine appears to function relatively well. The lack of firm statutory support for the doctrine,
and, more importantly, the emerging constitutional concerns
about the structure of the bankruptcy courts and supervision
by the judiciary might, however, lead the Court to take up the
doctrine.
This article takes no predictive position on these questions. The arguments have been well developed by Judge
Krause and amplified in Judge Moore’s dissent in the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in In re City of Detroit, Michigan.84 Instead, this
article will focus more closely on the role of the doctrine in
the bankruptcy process. For most bankruptcy practitioners,
and, likely for many bankruptcy judges, the utility and need
for the doctrine is a matter of faith. Chapter 11 reorganization, one often hears, is a unique process that cannot necessarily be subject to judicial rules that apply to two-party disputes.
The fragile negotiations that characterize a Chapter 11 plan
82. Id. at 287–88.
83. Id. at 288.
84. See In re City of Detroit, Michigan, 838 F.3d 792, 805–12 (6th Cir.
2016) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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and the need to resolve financial distress quickly make such an
extraordinary doctrine as equitable mootness necessary. The
remainder of this article challenges that conclusion.
II.
THE ROLE OF EQUITABLE MOOTNESS IN
BANKRUPTCY NEGOTIATIONS
As noted above, equitable mootness is most often viewed
as a necessary device to protect reliance by establishing the finality of plan confirmations. Courts applying the doctrine
often view the facts supporting the application through a rearview mirror. Because the plan of reorganization has been consummated and transactions have occurred that would be difficult to unwind without upsetting reliance interests or creating
chaos, the court is forced to dismiss the appeal. In fact, however, the consequences of the doctrine are not limited to its
ex-post effect, but extend to the negotiation process itself. This
Part frames the doctrine not so much as a prudential limitation on appeals but instead as a negotiating tool that can be
expertly wielded to help forge (or force) a reorganization bargain.
A. Negotiation, Legal Guardrails, and the
Effect of Appellate Review
Reorganization presents a uniquely complex negotiation
problem. Uncertainty surrounding the value of the business
and its assets, the entitlements of specific claimants, the value
added by some participants, and any number of case specific
contingencies characterizes the process. Representation of farflung constituencies, such as small vendors, employees, tort
claimants, and others often is less than perfect. The negotiations normally take place in a crisis atmosphere as the participants not only must organize and conduct the negotiations,
but must also stabilize the business and make hard decisions
regarding its proper scope and operation going forward. Add
the fact that pre-bankruptcy claimants and shareholders have
no choice but to bargain with each other. For most participants, walking away is not an option. Finally, the disparate entitlements create opportunities for strategic behavior and shifting alliances throughout the negotiation process.
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Chapter 11 sets out a process and provides a forum that is
intended to promote and manage these negotiations. Most of
the rules are procedural. The Code sets out voting rights,85
disclosure requirements,86 a representational structure,87 and
provides notice and opportunity to be heard for significant decisions throughout the case.88 Some of the rules are substantive, however. Central to the promotion of negotiated solutions are the provisions of the Code that bind dissenting claimants to the deals reached by others subject to default rules that
set out minimum distributional requirements. The absolute
priority rule assures that dissenting classes of creditors will receive distributions that generally align with non-bankruptcy
priorities.89 The best interests test requires distributions under
a Chapter 11 plan to provide objecting individual creditors at
least as much as they would have received in a Chapter 7
case.90
Although Chapter 11 is generally viewed as a negotiating
process, these procedural and substantive rules provide guardrails to assure that the strongest claimants do not run roughshod over the other participants in the case. Thus, Chapter 11
carves out a substantial space for the judge in interpreting, applying, and enforcing the rules, and uncertainty regarding the
content and scope of the rules has a significant impact on the
negotiations.
Even though the Code has been in place for forty years,
there is a substantial amount of uncertainty regarding critical
Chapter 11 rules that directly impact the substantive rights and
negotiating leverage of the participants. For example, only recently has the Supreme Court found it necessary to reaffirm
the basic priority structure underlying the Code,91 and the
right of secured creditors to credit bid their claims.92 Circuit
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (right of claimants to accept or reject plan).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (postpetition disclosure and solicitation of votes)
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (creditors’ and equity security holders’ committees).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (right to be heard).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (requirement that plan comply with priority
structure).
90. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (codifying the best interest test).
91. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
92. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639
(2012).
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courts continue to struggle with such fundamental issues as
the ability to circumvent priority through class skipping gift
distributions93 and to release participants and others from
third-party claims.94 This legal uncertainty combines with factual uncertainty to form the negotiating positions and leverage
of the participants in the process.
Legal and/or factual uncertainty is a feature of negotiations conducted in the shadow of the judicial system. The difference in Chapter 11 is that equitable mootness provides a
potential way for plan proponents and pivotal parties to limit
debate over legal entitlements to a single decision-maker—the
bankruptcy judge. By cutting off the potential appeal rights of
the objecting party, equitable mootness puts in place a potential imbalance in the legal risk faced by proponents and objecting parties. A court’s decision not to confirm a plan often
simply sends the parties back to the negotiating table. Thus,
plan proponents may develop reorganization plans that push
the boundaries of the legal rules knowing that they will either
convince the bankruptcy court to accept their interpretation
or will renegotiate under the court’s stricter interpretation.
Objecting parties who lose in the bankruptcy court, on the
other hand, only have the right to appeal left to their disposal,
a right which may never be realized if the reviewing court is
convinced that correcting such errors would lead to chaos and
disappointed expectations.
Thus, one might suspect that the prospect of equitable
mootness applying to cut off appeal rights is very much on the

93. Compare Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N.
Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 93–101 (2d Cir. 2011) (overturning a plan of reorganization where the plan contemplated a priority skipping “gift” distribution), with In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 555–58 (3d Cir. 2015)
(permitting such a distribution). For a discussion of the issue, see Ralph
Brubaker, Taking Chapter 11’s Distribution Rules Seriously: “Inter-Class Gifting Is
Dead! Long Live Inter-Class Gifting!”, 31 BANKR L. LETTER No. 4 (2011).
94. Compare Resorts Int’l v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d
1394, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the bankruptcy court may not
confirm a plan that releases third-party claims), with Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 656–62
(6th Cir. 2002) (holding that such releases are possible, but finding that the
releases at issue were not properly structured).
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minds of participants in a bankruptcy reorganization.95 As the
following discussion demonstrates, the doctrine is an important feature of bankruptcy negotiations. Rather than simply
protecting the finality of the case and the reliance of third parties doing business with the post-confirmation debtor, equitable mootness is often viewed prospectively as a method to encourage reliance and accelerate finality.
B. Does Equitable Mootness Protect or Encourage Reliance?
As stated above, most courts point to the reliance parties
place on the corporate structure and entitlements contained
in the plan as the main reason for overcoming the appeal
rights set out in the judicial code. The circuits’ views of what
types of reliance will support a claim of equitable mootness
vary significantly, however. This Part sets out two separate
types of reliance that might provide the justification for the
application of equitable mootness and discusses the views of
the courts regarding such types of reliance.
A decision overturning a plan of reorganization may affect two separate categories of parties. Perhaps most compelling are parties who have extended credit or otherwise contracted with the debtor following the confirmation of the plan.
The overturning of a plan of reorganization may impair the
debtor’s ability to fulfill these post-confirmation obligations,
thus disappointing these parties’ reasonably developed expectations. Every court would likely agree that the standards for
equitable mootness are satisfied by such third-party reliance.
The pre-bankruptcy claimants whose claims are compromised or otherwise dealt with in the plan also develop a reliance interest in the plan’s provisions, as do some third parties
who invest in the debtor as part of the plan. Chapter 11 reorganizations create a global settlement in which each parties’
treatment is dependent upon all the other parties’ treatment.
The very nature of bankruptcy is that there is a fixed pie and
multiple claimants with differing views of their entitlements to
a slice of the pie. Thus, pre-bankruptcy stakeholders negotiate
with each other and their negotiating positions and agreements are often dependent upon the complex web of all the
95. As Professor Kuney observed in the context of mootness arguments,
“Give any good lawyer a tool like that and she will use it.” George W. Kuney,
Slipping into Mootness, 2007 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 9.
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agreements. An order overturning one aspect of a plan may,
therefore, affect other unrelated deals that parties have made.
Some courts view this type of “deal reliance,” as enough to justify equitable mootness.
These two types of reliance and the courts’ reactions to
them can be illustrated by comparing two cases—one from the
Ninth Circuit, which limits equitable mootness to cases of
third-party reliance; and one from the Second Circuit, in
which deal reliance was sufficient for equitable mootness.
The view that third-party reliance is necessary for equitable mootness is represented by the Ninth Circuit case, In re
Transwest Resort Properties, Inc.96 There, the secured creditor objected to a plan of reorganization that limited the post-bankruptcy effect of a due-on-sale clause in the years following plan
confirmation.97 In addition, the secured creditor also argued
that the plan violated one of the requirements for confirmation contained in Code section 1129(a).98 The bankruptcy
court confirmed the plan and denied the secured creditor’s
motion for a stay, holding that the possibility that the consummation of the plan would render a potential appeal moot was
“speculative, at best.”99 The district court, on appeal, held that,
although the secured creditor was diligent in seeking a stay,
the plan had been substantially consummated and that third
parties had relied on the plan.100
The party that had most obviously relied on the plan was a
new investor (“SWVP”) in the debtor. The plan provided that
SWVP would invest $30 million and would become the sole
96. See In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 801 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th
Cir. 2015).
97. The secured creditor had made an 1111(b) election to treat the entirety of its claim as secured. Although the mechanics of 1111(b) are complex, the purpose of the election is to protect the secured creditor against an
undervaluation of its collateral by requiring full payment in the event the
collateral is sold soon after bankruptcy. Id. at 1165. The secured creditor
claimed that the limitation on the due on sale clause eliminated that protection. Id. at 1166.
98. Specifically, the creditor argued that the court misapplied the section
1129(a)(10) requirement that at least one impaired class vote in favor of the
plan. The bankruptcy court followed a line of decisions holding that the
requirement only applies to a plan, and not to each individual debtor covered by the plan. Id. at 1166–67.
99. Id. at 1167.
100. Id.
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owner of a group of the debtors.101 The Ninth Circuit rejected
the debtors’ claim that SWVP was the type of innocent third
party that deserved the protection of equitable mootness. The
court noted that SWVP participated in the confirmation hearings and in the initial stages of the appeal, and concluded that
that involvement meant that SWVP was not an innocent third
party.102 The court held, “[W]hen a sophisticated investor
such as SWVP helps craft a reorganization plan that ‘presses
the limits’ of the bankruptcy laws, appellate consequences are
a foreseeable result.”103
The court went on to note that relief could be fashioned
without unwinding the plan, stating that the court could adjust
the duration of the exception to the due on sale clause or fashion some other sort of monetary relief and could grant monetary relief for the confirmation violation.104 The reorganized
debtor claimed that any adjustment would be inequitable, presumably because it would interfere with the expectations of
the other parties to the plan. The court rejected that contention and held that although the plan had been consummated,
it would be possible to fashion an “equitable remedy for each
objection that would not bear unduly on innocent third parties.”105
The Ninth Circuit’s view stands in sharp contrast with
those of the Second Circuit in In re Charter Communications,
Inc.106 There the debtor, a group of bondholders, and Paul G.
Allen, the debtor’s controlling investor, engaged in pre-petition negotiations that culminated in a settlement that formed
the basis for a prepackaged plan. The pre-bankruptcy settlement required Allen to retain ownership and take other actions necessary to preserve net operating losses and to avoid a
default in the debtor’s senior debt. Allen received substantial
cash and a release of liability for himself and the management
101. Id. at 1164–65.
102. Id. at 1169.
103. Id. at 1170 (quoting In re Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d 229, 244 (5th Cir.
2009)); see also In re Sunnyslope Housing, Ltd. P’ship, 818 F.3d 937, 945 (9th
Cir. 2016) (equity investor in debtor who participated in development of
plan was not the type of innocent third party who is protected by equitable
mootness).
104. Transwest, 801 F.3d at 1171–73.
105. Id. at 1173.
106. In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2012).
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of the debtor. The settlement discussions did not include certain holders of convertible notes, other equity owners of the
debtor or the senior lender.107 During the bankruptcy, these
excluded shareholders and creditors objected to the settlement at every turn, and objected to the bankruptcy court’s valuation of the debtor and the plan’s compliance with the Code.
Included within those objections was a claim that the thirdparty release was unjustifiable.
Following a nineteen-day hearing the bankruptcy court
confirmed the plan and later denied the objecting creditor’s
motions for an emergency stay. The district court also denied
a stay and the plan took effect a mere 13 days after confirmation. On appeal, the district court held that the case was equitably moot, relying heavily on a nonseverablity clause in the
plan.108 The confirmation order included a provision that the
terms of the plan—terms that expressly included the settlement—were “nonseverable and mutually dependent,” and
could not be “deleted or modified” absent the consent of the
parties to the settlement.109 This clause placed the settlement
at the heart of the plan, leading the district court to conclude
that it could not grant any remedy. In addition, the court
noted that the contractual arrangements contained in the settlement had been performed and that Allen had detrimentally
relied on the confirmation.110
The Second Circuit affirmed, applying the presumption
analysis unique to that circuit.111 Under that analysis, the substantial consummation of the plan creates a presumption in
favor of equitable mootness unless the appellant can demonstrate each of five factors is met. The Second Circuit found
that the claims were not constitutionally moot (factor 1); that
the adversely affected party, Allen, had an opportunity to participate in the appeal (factor 4); and that the appellant had
diligently sought a stay (factor 5).112 The Second Circuit’s application of equitable mootness turned on the fact that the settlement at issue was a critical aspect of the plan itself and that
107. Id. at 480.
108. In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 449 B.R. 14, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d,
691 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2012).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 25–26.
111. See Charter, 691 F.3d at 482.
112. Id. at 484–85.

506

NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 15:477

unwinding the settlement would “cut the heart out of the reorganization” in a way that would affect Charter’s ability to
emerge as a reorganized entity (factor 2) and would require
the unwinding of complex transactions undertaken after consummation (factor 3).113 Thus, even though Allen was a participant in the plan, and was not an “innocent third party”
under the views of the Ninth Circuit in Transwest, the Charter
court held that the threat to the success of a plan precluded
review—even if the settlement agreement and releases were
not legally supportable.114
Charter rests on the notion that equitable mootness is necessary to protect the deal itself. The court went to some length
to explain the ways in which the Allen settlement was necessary
to the reorganization effort and the ways in which upsetting
that settlement—even if it violated the rights of the parties excluded from the settlement discussions—would create a situation in which a new compromise would be difficult.115 Allen
and the other settling parties were all sophisticated investors
and could not be said to have reasonably relied on its legality
when the parties excluded from the settlement objected
throughout the process. That is, unless they were also relying
on the doctrine of equitable mootness to shield their plan
from review.
On this view, the doctrine of equitable mootness does not
so much protect reliance as it does create the conditions for
reliance to exist. This point was made by the dissenting judge
in Transwest, the Ninth Circuit case that refused to protect the
claimed reliance of the third-party investor under the plan.116
113. Id. at 485–86. (The court warned against placing too much reliance
on the nonseverability clause in this analysis, noting that such clauses are
ubiquitous and would result in mooting virtually every appeal in which a stay
was not granted.).
114. Id. at 486.
115. Id. at 486 n.5.
116. See In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 801 F.3d 1161, 1174 (9th
Cir. 2015) (Smith, J. dissenting) (“I strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the equitable mootness doctrine is not meant to protect the
interests of a third-party investor in SWVP’s position. The majority concludes
that we should not consider how the proposed remedies will affect SWVP’s
interests because SWVP participated in the bankruptcy proceedings, and, to
some extent, in this appeal. But we have never held that we may ignore a
third-party investor’s interests merely because the third party participated in
the proceedings.”).
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The dissent made clear its view that the purpose of equitable
mootness is not to protect reliance, but to encourage reliance:
The majority suggests that SWVP was not entitled to
rely on the finality of the confirmation order because
it could reasonably foresee that the order would be
appealed. This argument unduly focuses on the reasonableness of SWVP’s reliance, rather than on the
compelling reasons why investors should be affirmatively encouraged to rely on the finality of confirmation orders.117
The Transwest dissent found substantial support for its
broad view of reliance in cases from the Third, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits. In In re GWI PCS 1, Inc.,118 the Fifth Circuit
rejected the argument that “insiders” lack the reliance interests necessary to invoke the doctrine, stating that “it would be
natural for many, if not a majority, of the transactions set forth
in a reorganization plan to involve the participants of the
chapter 11 proceedings.”119 Similarly, the Third Circuit has
held, “Our inquiry should not be about the ‘reasonableness’ of
the Investors’ reliance or the probability of either party succeeding on appeal. Rather we should ask whether we want to
encourage or discourage reliance by investors and others on
the finality of bankruptcy confirmation orders.”120 Finding
that reliance should be encouraged, the Third Circuit applied
the doctrine and dismissed the appeal.121 The Seventh Circuit
justified granting broad protection to deal reliance on economic terms, stating that “Every incremental risk of revision
on appeal puts a cloud over the plan of reorganization, and
derivatively over the assets of the reorganized firm. . . . By protecting the interests of persons who acquire assets in reliance
on a plan of reorganization, a court increases the price the
estate can realize ex ante, and thus produces benefits for creditors in the aggregate.”122
Thus, equitable mootness is justified by the desire to maximize the overall value of the estate by cutting off rights to
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
In re GWI PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 802.
In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1996).
Id.
In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 1994).
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appeal and thereby encouraging participants in the process to
invest new dollars and compromise claims. The need to
achieve a deal trumps fussy concerns about the need to adhere
to normal judicial process. Bankruptcy is viewed as an exceptional process producing unique problems that cannot necessarily be resolved by conventional judicial means. The justifications for the doctrine are based on pure pragmatism, and not
more traditional and limited equitable principals.
Charter is a uniquely apt demonstration of this brand of
short-sighted pragmatism. There, several of the principal parties engaged in negotiations over a significant deal that would
affect not only their own claims, but also claims of other creditors against parties besides the debtor. The terms of the settlement included releases of parties to the settlement from
claims held by these excluded creditors—raising a controversial issue that has been the subject of considerable debate
among the courts. Once agreement among these negotiating
creditors was secured, the plan was presented in a package to
the bankruptcy court as a done deal. Once approved, the parties moved quickly to implement the plan, presenting the appellate courts a fait accompli that could not be undone without
significant pain. While it is undoubtedly true that the doctrine
of equitable mootness made this particular deal possible because the parties to the deal could rely on its finality, one has
to wonder what type of deal might have been struck if the included parties had been forced to take account of the possibility that the excluded parties might have a right to appeal.
C. Does Equitable Mootness Protect or Accelerate Finality?
Inextricably tied to the reliance theory of equitable mootness is the notion that it protects the finality of the court’s confirmation order. A moment’s reflection, however, reveals that
the doctrine is not is necessary to protect finality. Finality will
come whether or not the confirmation is appealed—appeals
run their course and ultimately the controversy will be over.
Thus, rather that protecting finality, the point of equitable
mootness is that the doctrine accelerates finality to the earliest
possible point in time—the consummation of the transactions
contemplated by the plan.
This point can be best illustrated by examining cases in
which the court considers a stay of a plan confirmation. The
easiest way to avoid the difficulties of unscrambling an egg is,
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of course, to avoid scrambling it in the first place. A stay of
confirmation might permit the parties to maintain the status
quo while securing an appellate determination regarding the
fundamental legal issues that might affect the plan. Doing so,
however, may delay finality beyond the time at which the business will fail, or at least will lose substantial value. The analogy
to a “melting ice cube” is common.123
The Bankruptcy Rules provide for an automatic stay of
confirmation orders for fourteen days and plan proponents
may, and sometimes do, seek a reduction of that time.124 Beyond that period, the Rules provide that parties may seek a
further stay pending appeal.125 Generally, the motion for a
stay must be filed in the bankruptcy court and is reviewable by
the court in which the appeal is filed, however, there the rules
provide that the movant may bypass the bankruptcy court
upon a showing that filing a motion in the bankruptcy court
would be impracticable.126 The rules also provide that the
court may impose a bonding requirement as a condition of the
relief.127
Although courts differ regarding the application of the
standards for a stay, most agree that a stay motion should be
analyzed under a four-part test in which the movant must show
some combination of (1) a likelihood of substantial injury to
the moving parties if the stay were denied; (2) a likelihood (or
a possibility) of success on appeal; (3) lack of a substantial injury by non-moving parties if the stay were granted; and (4)
the public interest in favoring (or denying) a stay.128 There is a
split regarding whether the movant must show that all of the
123. See In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 551 (3d Cir. 2015);
Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of
Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 884–89 (2014). Although
the melting ice cube reference is most often found in cases considering asset
sales under 11 U.S.C. § 363, the analogy is apt in the stay context as well.
124. Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 3020(e).
125. Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 8007.
126. Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 8007(b)(2).
127. Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 8007(c).
128. See In re A & F Enterprises, Inc. II, 742 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2014);
In re First S. Sav. Ass’n, 820 F.2d 700, 709 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Gen. Motors
Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); Richard S. Kanowitz &
Michael A. Klein, The Divergent Interpretations of the Standard Governing Motions
for Stay Pending Appeal of Bankruptcy Court Orders, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 3
(2008).
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factors point toward granting a stay or if they are to be thought
of as a balancing test.129
In the context of equitable mootness, the relative balance
of harms to the moving and non-moving parties is particularly
relevant. Some courts hold that equitable mootness, standing
alone, is not sufficient to show irreparable injury.130 Others
find that the prospect that a plan may be substantially consummated, and so difficult to unwind that equitable mootness
would apply, is enough to show that the movant would be irreparably injured.131 That harm to the movant, however, is
often offset by the corresponding harm to the non-moving
parties—delay in finality of the plan, finality that would ultimately be protected by the equitable mootness doctrine.
The bankruptcy case of General Motors provides a case in
point. The stay decision there involved the sales order under
which the assets of GM were sold to “new GM” free and clear
of certain claims held by the movants. The litigants sought
both a direct appeal of the sale order and a stay of the order,
basing their stay motion on the fact that if the sale closed,
there would be a high probability that the appeal would be
dismissed as moot. The bankruptcy court agreed with this
probability and with the argument that such dismissal would
cause irreparable injury to the movants.132 Tipping the scales
against the stay, however, was the court’s view that granting the
stay would “result in extraordinary prejudice to all of the other

129. See Kanowitz & Klein, supra note 128; Gen. Motors, 409 B.R. at 30.
130. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 206 (D. Del. 2012), aff’d, 729
F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The Third Circuit and courts within its appellate
jurisdiction have previously recognized, however, that the risk of equitable
mootness by itself is insufficient to demonstrate irreparable injury for purposes of a stay.”); Kanowitz & Klein, supra note 128, at 4.
131. See In re Tribune Co., 477 B.R. 465, 477 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012), in
which the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, contrary to the District Court in W.R.
Grace, held that the likelihood that an appeal will be dismissed based on
equitable mootness is sufficient to constitute irreparable harm. See also In re
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 361 B.R. 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that
potential equitable mootness constitutes irreparable injury and stating, “The
strong possibility of mootness based on substantial consummation of a bankruptcy plan means that absent a stay of an order confirming a plan of reorganization pending appeal, many bankruptcy court confirmation orders will
be immunized from appellate review even if the remaining stay factors are
satisfied.”).
132. Gen. Motors, 409 B.R. at 31.
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parties in [the] case, in both direct monetary terms and terms
of irreparable injury.”133
The court was motivated by the fact that the U.S. Government, the principal funder of the sale transaction, was willing
to extend financing only if the sale transaction was consummated within a matter of days of the stay decision. The consequences of a loss by GM of that funding would, the court
found, be a liquidation,134 imposing a “staggering” injury on
the public interest. This prospect led the court to conclude
that the balancing of the factors was not even close to favoring
a stay. Even if the government’s financing offer could be extended, the court opined that GM might nevertheless fail because customers would be reluctant to buy cars from a manufacturer “whose future was uncertain and that was entangled
in the bankruptcy process.”135 The court stated, “Causing all of
those interests to be sacrificed for these litigants’ ability to
avoid mootness arguments is an intolerable result.”136 Underscoring that conclusion, the court found that even if all of the
other irreparable injuries to the employees, retirees, suppliers,
and dealers could be addressed, the minimum bonding requirement would be $7.4 billion—an amount the movants
were unwilling to post.137
Obviously, the GM case presents an extreme example of
the costs of delaying finality. It does, however, illustrate one
important point about the role of equitable mootness. The
doctrine works alongside the stay analysis in complex cases to
force early finality to the plan confirmation. The court there
was convinced that the effect of the stay denial would be a loss
by the objecting parties of appeal rights on an issue that, while
fairly settled in the Second Circuit, was controversial when
viewed on a national level.138 Nevertheless, the deal the court
133. Id. at 32.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 32.
136. Id. at 33.
137. Id. at 34
138. In the sale order opinion, the court stated, “Viewed nationally, the
caselaw is split in this area, both at the Circuit Court level and in the bankruptcy Courts. Some courts have held that section 363(f) provides a basis for
selling free and clear of successor liability claims, and others have held that it
does not. But the case law is not split in this Circuit and District.” In re GMC,
407 B.R. 463, 503–04 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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was presented was the only one available and the court was
convinced that it truly was a onetime offer to save an enormous melting ice cube. Given the stakes involved and the complexity of the problem, the entire case was an exercise in pragmatism trumping the normally principled judicial process.
Not every case is so complicated, however. The court in
General Motors distinguished the facts of that case from those of
In re St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc.,139 in which the U.S. government objected to a release of the post-bankruptcy responsible officer from potential future CERCLA liability. The plan
there was simple and contemplated the liquidation of the
debtor. All that was at stake was a potential two-week delay in
creditor distributions while the court considered an expedited
appeal.140 These factors justified the court’s decision to grant a
stay.141
Nevertheless, the financial distress giving rise to bankruptcy often creates a sense of crisis and impending doom that
makes melting ice cube arguments powerful. This seems particularly likely in contemporary reorganizations that are
marked by a critical need for continued financing and early
sale motions. In some cases, everything seems like an emergency142 and credible threats by the major players to withdraw
from financing or sale transactions, such as the government’s
threat in GM, would be hard for a bankruptcy judge to resist.
III.
THE DARK SIDE OF EQUITABLE MOOTNESS
There is considerable force to the idea that bankruptcy
presents a set of unique problems that require unique solutions. The efficiency of the bankruptcy process has long been a
subject of intense interest among its practitioners and commentators. On this criteria, equitable mootness seems a logical
139. In re St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 185 B.R. 687, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
140. Id. at 690.
141. Id. at 691.
142. See Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations
and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1407
(2010) (“[T]the very ‘nature of Chapter 11 practice,’ where the stock in
trade is akin to that of the hospital emergency room, ‘tends to quickly transform [even] so-called extraordinary and exceptional relief—to be granted
only when absolutely necessary for a successful reorganization—into the ordinary routine.’ ”).
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way to bring cases to a swift and certain conclusion while still
providing objecting parties an opportunity to be heard. The
result might be justified as providing a balance between pursuing the rehabilitative goals of Chapter 11 (or at least the maximization of the value of the business for all of the stakeholders) on one side and the protection of dissenting creditors on
the other. The notion that everyone should have the right to
pursue every possible legal argument in every possible venue is
unrealistic and some compromises to principal are necessary.
Minority claimants should not be able to wield appeal rights as
a strategic device to leverage a better payout at the expense of
the rest of the claimants.
On the other hand, equitable mootness presents its own
opportunities for strategic behavior. The doctrine might itself
be wielded in an effort by the most powerful claimants in the
case to force through a plan that violates the entitlements of
the less powerful by presenting the plan as a fait accompli—a
plan that represents the absolute best that can be negotiated,
and one that, if delayed, will result in the collapse of the business and losses for all. Such a presentation would be a gamble
but with enough pressure on the bankruptcy judge, it might
accomplish the goal. As Judge Krause noted, “Under these circumstances, equitable mootness merely serves as part of a
blueprint for implementing a questionable plan that favors
certain creditors over others without oversight by Article III
judges.”143
Charter Communications might be cynically viewed as just
such an effort. Charter involved a prepackaged bankruptcy case
that the bankruptcy court described as “perhaps the largest
and most complex prearranged bankruptcy ever attempted.”144 The case involved several contested issues involving controversial and unsettled bankruptcy questions: among
them, the authority of the court and desirability of granting a
third party release145 and the ability to confirm a joint plan of
reorganization—a plan that reorganizes multiple corporate
entities—based on the affirmative vote of a single class of cred-

143. One2One Commc’ns, LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 805 F.3d 428, 448
(3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J. concurring).
144. In re Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221, 230 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
145. Id. at 257–59.
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itors from only one of the reorganized entities.146 The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, overruling the well-articulated objections of a group of equity holders and a group of
bond holders who were not even participants in the pre-bankruptcy negotiations. Following that decision, the bankruptcy
court denied a motion for an emergency stay. The plan took
effect 13 days after the bankruptcy court’s decision whereupon
the debtor moved immediately to take actions to implement
the plan.147 The Second Circuit’s holding that the plan was
equitably moot forestalled any further consideration of the dissenters’ objections.
If that characterization is true, Charter came to a dismal
result, but not because the bankruptcy court necessarily got
the law wrong or because the dissenters did not have an opportunity to present their objection. By all accounts, the confirmation hearing was a hard fought148 and the issues were
thoroughly aired. The real problem with the decision is that it
enabled the plan proponents to construct a single plan that
simply bypassed the easily articulable objections of the dissenting creditors, present it to the bankruptcy court as a done deal
that was the only hope for the salvation of this enormous and
complex entity, implement it immediately and insulate it
against further question.149 The only protection available to
the dissenters was that provided by a lone judge under immense pressure to approve the only reorganization plan
presented. The bankruptcy court recognized the approach
taken by the plan proponents:
Viewed simplistically, the litigation over confirmation
amounts to an inter-creditor dispute over which class
of creditors should receive enhanced returns. Viewed
more theoretically, the litigation is a test of the chap146. Id. at 266.
147. In re Charter Commc’ns., Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 2012).
148. Id. (noting that the confirmation hearing spanned nineteen days and
that the objectors had objected at every stage of the proceedings).
149. See Ross E. Elgart, Note, Bankruptcy Appeals and Equitable Mootness, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 2311, 2313–14 (1998) (commenting on a similar result in
Continental that “The act of investing becomes the estoppel grounds on
which an appeal will not be entertained, regardless of its merit. Such a holding grants extraordinary judicial power to sophisticated investment bankers
who know how to exploit this invitation extended to them by the Third Circuit.”).

2019]

PRAGMATISM VS. PRINCIPLE

515

ter 11 process itself. The parties who negotiated the
Plan did so knowing that this major struggle with the
lenders would follow. Accordingly, this contest is the
culmination of calculated pre-bankruptcy planning
(that might even be called a gamble) designed to obtain significant restructuring benefits over the foreseeable strenuous objections of formidable adversaries.150
Of course, maybe the plan was the best deal the participants could have hoped for, or even the only deal. But, as Professor Brubaker has aptly pointed out, in these situations often
the only evidence the bankruptcy court has regarding the
need for such plan provisions is the self-serving statements of
the participants themselves.151 This lack of evidence, coupled
with the desire of judges to “avoid ‘upsetting the applecart’”
creates a tendency to protect the deal152—a tendency that
likely carries over to the equitable mootness decision. The
point here is that we cannot know what deal might have been
worked out through a process that gave the dissenters the leverage to force a seat at the table.
IV.
EQUITABLE MOOTNESS AND THE QUALITY OF BANKRUPTCY
COURT ADJUDICATION
None of this matters much if bankruptcy courts can be
trusted to get most decisions right in the first place. Naturally
one would expect some errors in bankruptcy court decisionmaking, but it may be that the overall error rate of bankruptcy
judges is in fact lower than that of their Article III reviewers. If
that is true, the losses from limiting appeal rights may not be
significant compared to value of reaching a quick and final
deal. Good data on error or reversal rates is somewhat hard to
come by,153 but there is no reason to believe that bankruptcy
150. Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. at 234.
151. See Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A
Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 959, 1027.
152. Id. at 1028.
153. The Administrative Office of the Courts publishes statistics on Circuit
Court of Appeals reversal rates, which generally show that with the exception
of 2015, Circuit Courts do not generally reverse bankruptcy decisions at a
greater rate than other decisions. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
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courts are reversed at a rate that is substantially higher than
other courts. Even reversal rates may not provide good information on the relative quality of bankruptcy court decisions—
bankruptcy courts may in fact be coming to the correct decisions and having those decisions reversed by reviewing
courts.154 In the absence of statistical data on the quality of
bankruptcy judgments, this Part discusses some of the qualitative considerations that might bear on the need for appellate
review of bankruptcy court decisions.
As noted above, one such consideration is that bankruptcy judges’ non-Article III status requires supervision by Article III judges and that appellate review is a fundamental component of that supervision. The arguments for and against this
position are well stated in the various concurring and dissenting opinions set out above as well as by some commentators.
This discussion, instead, focuses on prudential considerations—primarily the concerns relating to bankruptcy judges’
specialization and role in Chapter 11 cases.
What is most notable about bankruptcy judges is their specialization. Substantial academic literature has explored the effect of specialization on the quality of judicial decision-making,155 and some of that literature has specifically considered
JUST THE FACTS: U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.us
courts.gov/news/2016/12/20/just-facts-us-courts-appeals. The 2015 data is
aberrational, most likely due to a number of appeals of an issue that had
been erroneously decided by the Eleventh Circuit. See Jason Kilborn, What’s
Wrong with the Bankruptcy Courts? CREDIT SLIPS (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www
.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/01/whats-wrong-with-the-bankruptcycourts.html. The problem with this statistic is that it does not show whether
the Circuit Court is reversing the holding of the bankruptcy court or the
interim ruling of the District Court or Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. Dispositions of appeals in those intermediate courts are not provided. It bears noting, however, that a painstaking review of reported bankruptcy cases can and
has provided information on relative reversal rates of various courts in bankruptcy cases. See Jonathan R. Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1745 (2008) (reporting results of such a review). Expanding such an
inquiry is a potentially fruitful avenue of inquiry.
154. Nash & Pardo, supra note 153, at 1769–70 (noting the difficulties involved in determining the “correctness” of a particular judicial decision).
155. See generally Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization,
58 DUKE L.J. 1667 (2009) [hereinafter Baum, Probing the Effects]; Lawrence
Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1501 (2010) [hereinafter Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudica-
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the bankruptcy courts.156 The benefits of judicial specialization, particularly in the bankruptcy context, are many. Bankruptcy judges are drawn from the ranks of experienced bankruptcy practitioners bringing substantial expertise to what can
often seem a murky and difficult area of the law.157 By focusing on only one area of law, bankruptcy judges, can continue
to develop expertise and can develop better decision-making
heuristics.158
Bankruptcy judges’ immersion in bankruptcy cases may
not only lead them to develop subject matter and decisionmaking skill, it also likely contributes to the efficiency of the
bankruptcy process. This is particularly important in complex
Chapter 11 cases. Such cases have been increasingly transactional as asset sales and dominant creditor control have become the norm.159 Practices developed by judges immersed in
large complex reorganizations (the cases that are most susceptible to limited appellate review) have evolved to accommodate this development.160 Judges likely also develop a reputation for their decision-making approaches that provides some
tion]; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden
Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 59 DUKE L.J.
1477 (2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 67 (1995).
156. See Robert M. Howard & Shenita Brazelton, Specialization in Judicial
Decision Making: Comparing Bankruptcy Panels and Federal District Judge Panels,
22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 407 (2014); Nash & Pardo, supra note 153, at
1806; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
Bankruptcy Judges Mind, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1227 (2006).
157. Baum, Probing the Effects, supra note 155, at 1675–80 (discussing the
effect of specialization on expertise); Nash & Pardo, supra note 153, at 1806
(concluding, in the context of appellate review, that “[i]t would seem desirable for policymakers to introduce more multimember appellate tribunals
staffed by judges with particular expertise in the subject matter of the appeals.”); Rachlinski, Guthrie & Wistrich, supra note 156, at 1229 (discussing
the knowledge of bankruptcy judges).
158. Baum, Probing the Effects, supra note 155, at 1676; Rachlinski, Guthrie
& Wistrich, supra note 156, at 1229.
159. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate
Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 427–33 (2006) (discussing the
transactional nature of Chapter 11).
160. See Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 69, 92 (2004) (“Modern bankruptcy judges have become effective
and highly competent professionals. In the large case, the bankruptcy judge
is the Delaware Chancellor, the superbly professional magistrate who oversees a market for corporate control and ensures that it works effectively.”).
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information to the lawyers, as well as third-party bidders and
financers regarding the standards that will be applied to transactions or issues that require court involvement. Of course,
that probably accounts for some of the growth in the caseloads
in Delaware.161
One other benefit of both specialization and the method
of selection of bankruptcy judges has been raised by Professor
Troy McKenzie in an article examining the fit of bankruptcy
judges with Article III values.162 McKenzie notes that the judicial appointment process not only selects judges from the
ranks of bankruptcy lawyers, it is also responsive to the bankruptcy bar’s recommendations. Bankruptcy judges therefore
see the bankruptcy bar as their chief audience and they usually
share common views about the operation of the system.163
This relationship includes a recognition of bankruptcy judges’
“creative and energetic management of cases.”164 Perhaps
most importantly, he notes that such judges “share the outlook
of the bar from which they were selected and to which they
remain responsive – that of skilled professionals who place a
high value on pragmatic solutions to financial distress.”165 According to McKenzie, the bankruptcy bar is typically “unified
and public-minded in its views about the core aims and operations of the bankruptcy process” and that this attribute alleviates some of the countervailing concerns about capture that
such a close relationship might raise.166
Specialization and the relationship between bankruptcy
bar and bankruptcy judges also has some negative consequences. Lynn LoPucki has raised concerns about the potential for judicial competition for the biggest Chapter 11 cases—

161. Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting
Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1382 (2000)
(“The current evidence suggests that, in general, the ‘race’ to Delaware produces some efficiency gains.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue
in Corporate Law and Bankruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1276 (2000) (noting
that Delaware “developed a reputation for fast and efficient case administration”).
162. See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 797–805 (2010).
163. Id. at 797.
164. Id. at 798.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 799–805.

2019]

PRAGMATISM VS. PRINCIPLE

519

competition that has largely favored Delaware.167 According to
LoPucki, competition has been corrosive to the bankruptcy
process because it leads judges to adjust their decisions to be
more favorable to debtor interests.168 His suggested remedy is
a change in the venue rules to eliminate the competition that
results from forum shopping. LoPucki’s conclusions are controversial—the debate has been substantial and fullthroated,169 and will not be replicated here. It does bear noting however that the potential for capture is at least one of the
attributes of judicial specialization that might give rise to some
concern over lack of robust appellate review.
A more subtle, but equally significant problem with specialization and the close relationship between the bench and
bar is the potential for insularity—the natural tendency of
people to view issues from the perspective of the world in
which they live.170 This tendency—to see everything through
the bankruptcy lens—may make it difficult for bankruptcy
judges to assess whether bankruptcy doctrine has fallen out of
step with the Code, or broader legal doctrines and statutory
interpretation methods that have continued to evolve.171 The
concern may be particularly relevant in complex bankruptcy
reorganizations where certain practices have come to be accepted as a given despite the lack of firm grounding in the
Code.172
Financial distress of businesses presents problems that are
difficult, high stakes, intensely fact-driven, and immediate.
167. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 40–48 (2005).
168. Id. at 41.
169. For a sampling of critiques of LoPucki’s work, see Kenneth Ayotte &
David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 438–53 (2006), Jacoby, supra note 159,
at 423–37, and Charles J. Tabb, Courting Controversy, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 467,
489–92 (2006).
170. See Baum, Probing the Effects, supra note 155, at 1678; Chad M.
Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 858
(2012).
171. See Baum, Probing the Effects, supra note 155, at 1678; Oldfather, supra
note 170, at 858.
172. Baird, supra note 160, at 92–99 (discussing common practices that
have a weak, or non-existent basis in the Code, and noting, “They evolve and
remain largely unchecked until a district or appellate court is asked to
square the practice with the Bankruptcy Code.”).
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One can expect bankruptcy judges, as skilled professionals operating in a transactional setting, to work toward resolving issues in a flexible and creative way. We want that. Nevertheless,
there is likely to be some value in review of that creativity by
judges who are less immersed in the process.
Admittedly, this will be unconvincing to bankruptcy experts who view the process as so specialized that generalist
judges are unable to appreciate the unique problems confronted on the ground.173 There are at least two responses to
this view. First, at least first level appeals are not necessarily
decided by generalist judges. Bankruptcy appellate panels
where available can provide an alternative path for review and
while the judges on the panels are specialized, they lack immersion in the particular case. Second, over the past four decades or so since the enactment of the Code, there have been
several watershed moments in which emerging practices in
bankruptcy cases have been rejected by the Supreme Court
and despite occasional claims that the rejected practice is essential to the reorganization process, Chapter 11 has continued to find considerable success.174 Equitable mootness stands
in the way of those types of checks on insularity that may cause
the bankruptcy process to lose sight of the core principles that
undergird the doctrine—both in the individual case and on a
system-wide basis.
173. Nash and Pardo in their 2008 study of bankruptcy appeals find support for the fact that bankruptcy appellate panels offer higher quality appellate review than do district court and that other judicial actors perceive the
BAPs to provide a higher quality review. Nash & Pardo, supra note 153, at
1805–06. They further conclude that that result makes it “seem desirable for
policymakers to introduce more multimember appellate tribunals staffed by
judges with particular expertise in the subject matter of the appeals.” Id. at
1806.
174. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 978 (2017) (overturning structured dismissal that failed to comply with the Code’s priority
scheme); RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639,
649 (2012) (rejecting cramdown plan that did not permit the secured creditor to credit-bid); Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St.
P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 458 (1999) (new value plan cannot be confirmed without allowing others to compete for the equity in the reorganized debtor);
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 199 (1988) (rejecting
claim that sweat equity can serve as new value for purposes of the absolute
priority rule); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
484 U.S. 365 (1988) (undersecured creditors are not entitled to interest during the pendency of a bankruptcy case).
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V.
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS SURVIVE WITHOUT
EQUITABLE MOOTNESS?
Although equitable mootness has become a regular feature of the bankruptcy landscape, there are reasons to believe
that its future is not completely assured. The doctrine rests on
a somewhat fragile statutory structure and dissenting voices on
the Third and Sixth Circuits, including now Justice Alito, have
raised compelling statutory and constitutional arguments
against it.175 The doctrine may be headed for a Stern v. Marshall moment in which the Supreme Court throws settled belief out the window. For many, this would be a tragic loss of a
necessary reorganization tool. But, could the bankruptcy process survive the loss?
It is undoubtedly true that there are real costs to granting
full appeal rights in bankruptcy cases, although it is possible
that those costs are overstated by advocates of equitable mootness. Perhaps more importantly, most advocates of the doctrine mischaracterize the true source of the costs of appeal
rights in bankruptcy. That misunderstanding has affected the
cases and set the doctrine on the wrong path.
The real cost in allowing full appeal rights in bankruptcy
is not the upsetting of reliance interests. Those reliance interests are a function of the regime that is in place. In other
words, without equitable mootness, parties would understand
that engaging in transactions with the debtor carries the risk
that their interests would be adversely affected by an appellate
court order reversing a plan confirmation. For example, a
claim that an adverse outcome on appeal would affect the
value of stock issued under the plan proves entirely too much.
The risk of adverse litigation is ever-present and should be
priced into any reorganization deal that the parties have
struck. Similarly, the argument that quick resolution of the distress is critical lest the business (ice cube) melt away ignores
the possibility that the drafters of a plan can incorporate legal
contingencies into the plan’s provisions. The risk of an appeal
is a fact that is well known to the parties before the plan confirmation given the rules requiring objection and claim preservation. While drafting contingencies into a plan of reorganizaCAN
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175. See supra Section I.B.
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tion might not be possible in every instance, forcing parties to
confront the possibility that some contested issue might be the
subject of an appeal and reversal is likely to result in better,
more thoughtful, resolutions.
Indeed, equitable mootness may not be all that effective
in accelerating the finality of cases given the number of appeals of equitable mootness findings themselves. Judge Krause
addressed this problem in her One2One concurrence, observing that the appeal in that case had lasted two years. She
stated, “Even if we were affirming the District Court’s finding
of equitable mootness, there would not have been finality until
this point, as the possibility of reversal has loomed all
along.”176 Equitable mootness litigation may simply be a substitute for merits litigation and therefore the benefits of the doctrine in promoting early finality may well be overstated.
Rather than the conventional reliance arguments, the
cost of full appeal rights in bankruptcy is more likely to be
creditors’ ability to use the threat of an appeal as a hold-out
device that might make consensual bankruptcy resolutions
more difficult to achieve. One of the central features of the
bankruptcy process is the ability to bind dissenting parties.
This feature is necessary to prevent a situation in which all
claimants have an incentive to delay agreement in a way that
will increase their negotiating leverage. Everyone understands
that the last person to agree to a deal will be the person who
can obtain the best deal, thus no one agrees to a deal. On this
theory, the threat of an appeal, even by a small claimant whose
legal claims are tenuous or de minimis might grant that claimant more negotiating leverage than the claim merits. This leverage might create a situation in which multiple claimants routinely seek to create nuisance leverage making a global settlement impossible, or at least costly.
If the problem is the threat of frivolous, or at least tenuously grounded, appeals made strategically to increase negotiating leverage, then equitable mootness as it is currently applied is a poorly suited remedy. The doctrine cuts too widely—
eliminating well-grounded appeals involving important and divisive questions and involving high stakes, as well as tenuous

176. One2One Commc’ns, LLC v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 805 F.3d 428, 447
(3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring).
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claims by small creditors that challenge the weight of bankruptcy authority.
Other tools are available. As then-Judge Alito and Judge
Krause observed appellate courts have the power, after a ruling on the merits, to limit the relief granted on equitable
grounds.177 The ability to grant at least monetary relief, even if
what is sought is a complete reversal of the plan confirmation,
should enable most appeals to proceed. Concerns about the
abuse of the appellate process to interpose delay or eleventhhour objections intended for purely strategic purposes can be
handled under the doctrine of laches or based on the power
of the court to dismiss appeals based upon delay.178
Once the merits are reached, tenuous claims should be
easily uncovered and dealt with as such. If the claim is meritorious, the fact that monetary relief will reduce the value of
rights granted under the plan should not be viewed as upsetting the reliance interests of those parties any more than a substantial mass tort or antitrust verdict is thought to upset the
reliance interests of the shareholders of the company against
whom the claim is rendered. In any judicial process, the merits
of the claim, rather than the difficulties of litigating the claim,
should drive the outcome.
CONCLUSION
Although it is a regular feature of the bankruptcy landscape and is accepted doctrine by most Chapter 11 practitioners, most non-bankruptcy lawyers would likely agree that equitable mootness is, in the words of Justice Alito, a “curious doctrine.”179 It is a doctrine that invokes the language of judicial
restraint, with judges sometimes expressing frustration with
fact that the circumstances confronting them prohibit judicial
intervention. It is a doctrine that judges invoke to tell to disappointed appellants, “We would like to help you, but, you know,
it’s complicated.”
But equitable mootness is more than that. The very existence of the doctrine creates the circumstances that make it
necessary. The doctrine is intended to encourage the reliance
177. One2One, 805 F.3d at 449–50 (Krause, J., concurring); In re Cont’l
Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 571–72 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
178. One2One, 805 F.3d at 449 (Krause, J., concurring).
179. Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 567 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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that it claims to protect. It does not create finality, instead it
accelerates finality. Perhaps these things are necessary in some
cases. Bankruptcy negotiations are difficult undertakings and
often take place in a crisis atmosphere. Bankruptcy judges understand this, reviewing judges may not. Doctrines that finally
dispense with small conflicts may be necessary in the interest
of the global deal. The problem is determining which conflicts
are small. This may be particularly true when the reviewing
court does not even take a look at the merits of a case decided
by a specialist judge who may be thoroughly immersed in
bankruptcy law and its transactional character, and weighed
down by the real consequences of failure to achieve a deal. In
that environment, likely many disputes will seem small.

